On 24th September 1999 members of The Earl of Northampton’s
Regiment paid a commemorative visit to Rowton Moor, near Chester. A
wreath-laying ceremony at the battlefield memorial was followed by a
battlefield walk and talk. Two troops of Northampton’s Cavalry
fighting with Vaughan’s Brigade were either killed or captured at
Rowton and the troop commander Major Flanock Colbourne was taken
prisoner.
The events leading up to the disaster at Rowton Moor
By the autumn of 1645 the King, as stubborn as ever and reluctant
to admit defeat, was clutching at straws. On June 14th he had lost
the decisive battle of Naseby and on 10th July had lost the battle
of Langport. Between June and September 1645 Parliament had re-taken
Leicester, captured Carlisle and taken Pontefract Castle. South
Wales was rapidly falling under Parliamentary control and on 10th
September Prince Rupert surrendered Bristol. Following the defeat at
Naseby, the King, with remnants of his cavalry units, began a series
of what appeared to be aimless wanderings, his only real hope was to
join forces with the Marquis of Montrose, who had been marginalised
by the King and his High Command, but who was now seen to be the
saviour of the King’s cause. Whilst all England and South Wales was
falling into the hands of Parliament, Montrose was still working his
miraculous campaign of victories in Scotland. Against all odds he
had achieved further victories at Auldearn in May, at Alford in July
and at Kilsyth on 15th August. It begs questioning whether the King
really knew of Montrose’s strength, which was always weak, or
whether he believed Montrose to be invincible. Certainly Charles was
looking for inspiration and an archetypal leader to fight his cause,
especially since his lost faith in Rupert.
By 18th August the King had reached Doncaster on his mission to
join Montrose, who was marching south to join him. Charles,
believing that the Covenanting forces of Leslie were about to
converge on him, retreated south once again, to set up his
headquarters at Raglan Castle. In fact Leslie had no intention of
engaging the King, but rather to confront Montrose who had all but
taken Scotland. Leslie met Montrose at Philliphaugh on 13th
September and annihilated him with a force of 6,000 against 600. The
support that Montrose had always needed did not arrive and the
miracle needed was one too many; his myth was washed away in the
bloody butchery that followed Philliphaugh.
The King Leaves Raglan Castle
On 18th September the King, with his own Lifeguard and Vaughan’s
Brigade (mostly cavalry remnants of The Oxford/ Southern Army),
joined forces with Lord Langdale’s Northern and Lord Charles
Gerard’s Brigades - a force of 3,500-4,000 cavalry. They
rendezvoused at Atherstone Heath near Dorstone, near Hay-on-Wye.
There was no infantry, though accounts of the battle of Rowton Moor
suggest Royalist dragoon actions. On 20th or 21st September Charles
marched north once again, perhaps once again attempting to join
Montrose, not knowing the calamity that had befallen him on 13th
September. By marching north along the Welsh Borders he might not
only keep safe, but relieve Chester, one of the few Royalist
strongholds still remaining and, perhaps more importantly, the only
port in Royalist hands. Charles hoped that access to the Irish
seaboard might bring further reinforcements from Ireland. A third
reason for his departure was one of necessity as South Wales was
falling to Parliament, and the armies of Parliament were closing in
on him.
By 22nd September Charles had reached Chirk Castle and entered
Chester the next day from the Welsh side of the city. Chester had
been under constant siege since 1643, having sieges lifted at
intervals by Lord Byron, Prince Maurice and Prince Rupert, however
on 20th September, just as the King began his march, Brereton
stormed the east side of the city and took the suburbs on the
English side of the River Dee. The King was greeted with the news on
his arrival at Chirk Castle and the Royalist plan was to divide
forces and trap the besiegers. Charles entered Chester with his
Lifeguard and Lord Gerard’s Brigade of about 600 cavalry, his aim to
reinforce the garrison regiments of infantry commanded by Sir
Francis Gamull and Roger Mostyn. Further garrison support was
provided by Lord John Byron’s Regiment of Horse. Lord Byron had only
recently reinforced the garrison with Mostyn’s Welsh recruits and
was expecting further Welsh reinforcements from Hugh Wynne’s
inexperienced regiment of foot.
The King spent the night in the house of Sir Francis Gamull
whilst Langdale, in command of the main body of Horse, crossed the
River Dee at Holt and by dawn on 24th September was approximately
four miles from Chester at Millers Heath. Langdale commanded
approximately 3,000 cavalry and his original intention was to trap
and defeat the besieging Cheshire forces of Lt. Colonel Michael
Jones and Major-General James Lothian, or drive them off into
Cheshire towards Tarvin. Trapped between Langdale’s cavalry and the
Chester garrison, the besiegers would have had little chance.
However the relieving force had not bargained for the arrival of
Colonel-General Sydenham Poyntz who, with his 3,000 cavalry made up
of Northern and Midland Association troopers, had been tracking the
King’s movements for some time. Charles and Langdale were aware of
Poyntz shadowing their movements, but thought that he had been
shaken off and was too far away to disrupt the Royalist plans.
Unfortunately for the King, Poyntz was all too present, and as
Langdale crossed the Dee so Poyntz marched out of Whitchurch to meet
him.
The Battle (Round One)
Historical accounts of the actions of 24th September 1645 suggest
that for all Langdale and Poyntz were aware of each other’s relative
proximity, the mounted armies met quite unexpectedly on the morning
of the battle. By 5.00am Langdale had drawn up his army on Millers
Heath whilst Poyntz had advanced to Hatton Heath. The heaths lay
approximately half a mile apart and straddled what is now the main
Chester to Whitchurch Road. Poyntz was advancing along the road from
Whitchurch which enabled Langdale, with more rested forces, to
quickly take advantage of ground and line the hedgerows with his
dragoons. However Langdale was in something of a dilemma, as the
original intention was to trap the besiegers between his cavalry
units and the garrison force. The tables had been turned, and it was
he who was now trapped between the advancing Poyntz and the
Parliamentarian besieging forces. Indeed the situation was now one
of a tactical sandwich that held the ingredients of four separate
forces almost in a straight line being formed between the Chester
garrison and Poyntz’s position on Hatton Heath.
The Chester garrison had approximately 1,000 cavalry, made up of
Gerard’s Brigade, Byron’s Horse and the King’s Lifeguard. Within the
walls of Chester there must have been at least 500-800 foot made up
of Gamull’s and Mostyn’s regiments and additional small units of
foot gathered together by Byron to fend off the besieging forces.
According to Parliamentary accounts, the besieging force consisted
of 500 horse, 700 foot and 200 dragoons. Langdale had a force of
between 2,500-3,000 horse and Poyntz 3,000 horse. At this stage of
the conflict the odds would have been in favour of the Royalists.
Indeed there is evidence to suggest that the Royalists had
intercepted communications between the besieging Parliamentarians
and the advancing force of Poyntz. This enabled the advantage to
sway further to the Royalists, who could surprise the van of the
marching column.
At approximately 7.00am on 24th September Langdale’s dragoons
fired on Poyntz’s van as they moved along the Hatton Heath stretch
of the road. Poyntz’s horse then attacked Langdale’s position on
Millers Heath. The Parliamentarians were repulsed but not routed,
though they had clearly lost the encounter. Poyntz lost
approximately 20-30 dead and 60 Parliamentarian troopers were taken
prisoner.
Having taken the first blood, the Royalists now threw away any
advantage gained. A strange sequence of events then occurred in what
was an extraordinary day in which the Royalists once again proved
that they had a marvellous cavalier ability to grasp defeat from the
jaws of victory. Langdale withdrew to his position on Millers Heath
whilst Poyntz held his ground on Hatton Heath; both forces remained
for about ten hours facing each other at a distance of about half a
mile. At about 8.30am Langdale sent a message to the Chester
garrison, but there is no evidence of its content. Morris (1924)
describes how Lt. Col. Jeffrey Shakerley of Warden’s Regiment
carried Langdale’s message. Shakerley, a local man, knew the most
direct route to the city which avoided the besieging forces. He
crossed the River Dee in a wooden tub (a large vessel used for the
slaughtering of swine), rowing his make-shift boat across the deep
and wide waters of the Dee, along with a servant. His horse swam
alongside the tub and he managed to carry the message within 15
minutes. Barratt (1994) reminds us that we can only assume the
contents of the message and suggests that Langdale either claimed he
could hold and defeat Poyntz without assistance, or that he was
urgently in need of the garrison’s support.
Langdale, though able to send good news of an early victorious
encounter, was still in a very dubious position. He could certainly
not attack the besiegers or attempt to enter Chester, as Poyntz
would have fallen on his rear, and he seemed reluctant to attack
Poyntz again without support. It is clear from the outcome of the
day that something went tragically wrong with Royalist
communications. Had Langdale suggested that he could beat Poyntz
without support then surely he had committed a tactical error and
was ultimately responsible for the Royalist defeat. If on the other
hand he had requested support and it was not forthcoming, then the
King and the indecision of the garrison commander were responsible
for the defeat. For ten hours or so Langdale kept position, ‘waiting
for something’. A number of questions require answers; as usual
questions are easily placed, whilst answers remain the stuff of
conjecture and informed guess work.
The Battle (Round Two)
Why didn’t Langdale attack Poyntz again, especially since he had
gained the upper hand? Was he awaiting reinforcements that never
arrived? If he was waiting for support, then why did it not arrive?
Barratt (1994) points to a number of possibilities that might
account for Royalist indecision in the garrison. Byron and Langdale
had a known dislike of each other, Gerard and Digby rarely agreed on
anything, and the King had great difficulty in managing the
conflicts between his commanders. There is also the view that the
garrison were awaiting the arrival of Hugh Wynne’s Welsh Regiment
who were due to arrive that day, and did eventually arrive at about
2.00pm. Another account suggests that when the garrison saw the
withdrawal of some of the besiegers from the suburbs, they assumed
they were running away and the battle all but won. In fact it was
not a withdrawing force, but rather an attacking force mustering to
support Poyntz.
Hall (1889) and Atkinson (1909), having compiled tracts of the
events of 24th September 1645, each offer accounts of the tactical
deliberations from a Parliamentary perspective. Reports of the dawn
action gave an early indication that Poyntz had been utterly routed.
At this point the besiegers were considering withdrawal, as they
would have been clearly trapped between Langdale and the garrison.
However whilst debating the best tactical option, further news came
that Poyntz had held his ground and that his forces were intact. It
is worth remembering that the distance of communication was only
three miles and that Parliamentary forces were on the English side
of Chester, with no need to cross the Dee. Their communications were
effective and far more decisive than those between Langdale and the
garrison. There must have been prearranged signals set up by the
Parliamentarians throughout the morning and early afternoon. It is
well documented that when the besiegers fired two cannon shots prior
to their departure to join Poyntz, that Poyntz’s forces gave a great
cheer. It was obvious that Poyntz and his men knew what they were
waiting for, which is probably more than can be said of Langdale.
At about 2.00pm Lt. General Michael Jones led 350 horse out of
the ranks of the besieging forces supported by Colonel John Booth
with 500 musketeers. Their aim was to march along the Whitchurch-Chester
Road to support Poyntz and outflank Langdale. A besieging force of
1,000 foot and 200 horse was left in the command of Major General
Lothian. At about 4.00pm the Royalist garrison, observing the
movements of Jones and Booth from the city walls, realised that this
was not a withdrawing force, but rather an attacking force which
placed Langdale in dire peril. The Royalists sent out 500 horse and
500 foot under Gerard’s command, however the Royalists could not
venture out through the eastern suburbs in a direct route to attack
the rear of Jones’s marching column because of the besieging force.
Gerard had to manoeuvre his force around the suburbs, by which time
Lothian had observed the Royalist intentions and intercepted
Gerard’s force on Hoole Heath, on the fringe of the eastern suburbs.
A confusing action took place between Gerard’s force and half the
remaining besieging force commanded by Colonel Coote, and three
divisions of Shropshire cavalry and an infantry force commanded by
Captain Danielle. Both the Royalists and Parliamentarians claim
victory for this episode in an eventful day, but the victory
ultimately has to go to Parliament, as Gerard was prevented in his
attempt to attack Jones’s from the rear. Indeed Gerard was stopped
from joining Langdale, who had received orders to withdraw towards
Chester because of the threat that now prevailed.
However it was too late for Langdale. He withdrew a mile or so
closer to the City and took up position on open ground at Rowton
Moor. Poyntz had now been joined by his reinforcements and advanced.
As Langdale advanced for what appeared to be a typical cavalry
clash, he must have quickly realised the error of his judgement. The
musketeers of John Booth had taken up position in the hedgerows and
lanes around the village of Rowton and on the flanks of Langdale’s
advancing cavalry. As the cavalry clashed in the centre of the
battle, so the Parliamentary foot poured in volleys of shot from the
wings and devastated the van of Langdale’s advancing troopers.
The Royalist rear, which was essentially companies of Langdale’s
Northern Horse, fled in all directions, ‘without giving execution’,
some into Wales over Holt Bridge, whilst others galloped towards
Chester. This was not the first occasion in which the rear and
reserve of the Northern Horse had fled without giving battle, but
Langdale’s van and the forward units gave a good account of
themselves before fleeing the field.
Although the battle is often referred to as a cavalry battle, it
was without doubt won by the fire-power of well-positioned
Parliamentary musketeers, firstly on Rowton Moor with the decimating
volleys of Booth’s Regiment, and then, as the Royalists ran back
towards Chester, from the onslaught of Lothian’s musketeers.
“We hastened towards them in the best posture we could, the Horse
was the battell, because many, the wings were foot, because few;
they had the wind and the sun; we had God with us, which was our
word, counterpoising all disadvantages, and countermanding all
strength; a little before five o’clock we joined in a terrible
storm, firing in the faces of one another, hacking and slashing with
swords. Neither party gained or lost a foot of ground, as if
everyone were resolved there to breath their last. Whilst the
dispute was so hot and doubtful, our musquetiers so galled their
horse, that their rear fled, perceiving their losse by them, upon
whom they made no execution. Their van perceiving that, faced about
and fled also.”
True Relation quoted in Atkinson (1909)
The Battle (Round Three)
It was now early evening and Langdale was leading his routed
cavalry back towards Chester for sanctuary, with Poyntz snapping at
his rear, when he ran headlong into Lothian’s besieging forces.
Gerard had managed to rally a counter-attack, but accounts suggest
that Langdale’s routed cavalry crashed into Gerard’s position and
caused complete mayhem. Poyntz drove Langdale and Gerard back onto
the walls of Chester, and with the suburbs blocked by besiegers and
only narrow lanes to negotiate, the Royalist position became a
killing field for Lothian’s musketeers. A Royalist infantry sortie
was sent out under the command of Astley and Glemham to offer a
rearguard action, but they were driven back behind the city walls.
It was during these final conflicts that the Earl of Litchfield was
killed, and no less than eleven Royalists colonels taken prisoner.
The King had suffered a crushing defeat in which he had lost at
least 300 dead and over 1,500 wounded and taken prisoner. Although
there are no records of Parliamentary dead it is reasonable to
assume, based on the evidence available, that they too had lost
between 250-300 dead during the day’s conflicts.
Some accounts suggest that the King himself made a sortie out of
the city, others that he watched the whole of the day’s events from
first the Phoenix tower and then the Cathedral tower. One account
states that he was fired upon by a sniper positioned on the tower of
St. John’s Church in the suburbs. Though the sniper missed his mark,
he killed a captain who was in attendance on the King. Charles was
now in a perilous position and that night fled the city into the
relative safety of North Wales. Parliamentary records state that he
was observed leaving with the remnants of his army which was
calculated at about 600 horse. Before leaving, Charles requested
that Byron hold Chester for at least ten days in order to buy time
for his escape.
Byron, who had a chequered military career with indecision and
lack of judgement hanging over him from his leadership exploits at
Nantwich and then Marston Moor, now made amends for any previous
errors. He managed to achieve what Rupert could not do at Bristol
and held Chester until 3rd February 1646 against constant adversity,
and on numerous occasions turned back Brereton’s Cheshire forces
before finally surrendering. Brereton was not present at Rowton
Moor, though he did instigate the siege of Chester and was quick to
take credit for the actions of Poyntz, Jones, Lothian and Booth, who
all went on to make illustrious careers throughout the Civil War
years.
Bibliography
- History of The Siege of Chester During The
Civil Wars in The Time of King Charles I (1790). Printed in Chester by
Brosters & Son
- Tracts Relating to the Civil War in Cheshire
1641-1659 (1909). Ed. Rev. J A Atkinson
- Memorials of the Civil War in Cheshire and
the Adjacent Counties, Thomas Malbon (1889). Ed. J Hall
- The Siege of Chester 1643-1646, Canon R H
Morris (1924). Ed. P H Lawson
- The Civil Wars in Cheshire R N Dore (1966)
- The Siege of Chester and The Battle of Rowton Moor 1645, J
Barratt (1994)
Alf Thompson
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